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Resilience and Complexity 
Conjoining the Discourses of Two Contested Concepts 
By Rasmus Dahlberg1 
Abstract 
This paper explores two key concepts: resilience and complexity. The first is under-
stood as an emergent property of the latter, and their inter-relatedness is discussed 
using a three tier approach. First, by exploring the discourse of each concept, next, 
by analyzing underlying relationships and, finally, by presenting the Cynefin 
Framework for Sense-Making as a tool of explicatory potential that has already 
shown its usefulness in several contexts. I further emphasize linking the two con-
cepts into a common and, hopefully, useful concept. Furthermore, I argue that a 
resilient system is not merely robust. Robustness is a property of simple or compli-
cated systems characterized by predictable behavior, enabling the system to bounce 
back to its normal state following a perturbation. Resilience, however, is an emer-
gent property of complex adaptive systems. It is suggested that this distinction is 
important when designing and managing socio-technological and socio-economic 
systems with the ability to recover from sudden impact.  
 
Keywords: Resilience, robustness, complexity, emergency management, Cynefin 
Framework. 
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Introduction 
Resilience has gained remarkable popularity over the last decade, after the 2005 
Hyogo Framework for Action adopted the concept as a core element in its strategy 
for global disaster risk reduction (Dahlberg et al. 2015). Countries adopt “resilient 
strategies” in emergency planning and disaster preparedness (Cabinet Office 2011; 
National Research Council 2012; Rodin 2015) to a degree that in just a few years 
has elevated ‘resilience’ to buzzword-status. For instance, following the 2004 na-
tional plan in the USA, even critical infrastructure (CI) was subjected to resilient 
strategies meant to imbue CI “with a particular agency that literally breathes life 
into what was once deemed inanimate” (Evans & Reid 2014: 19). Resilient com-
munities and cities are wanted and needed everywhere (World Bank 2008; Ungar 
2011; Walker & Cooper 2011: 144). Further, corporations as well as individuals 
need to be resilient, and able to not only accept but also cope with the stress and 
shocks of modern-day society (Kupers 2014; Rodin 2015). Resilient citizens thus 
become subjects who “have accepted the imperative not to resist or secure them-
selves from the dangers they face (Evans & Reid 2014: 42). Unsurprisingly, a 
Google Ngram search shows an increase in the use of the word ‘resilience’ in Eng-
lish-language publications during the last two decades.2 
 
 
Figure 1. Google Ngram showing the percentage of publications in English 
with the occurrence of “resilience” (case sensitive) 1800-2008. 
 
The term resilience has been widely used over the last decade to describe man-made 
systems’ ability to recover from sudden impact. This widespread use has in fact led 
to the concept’s origins in ecological systems theory to be sometimes forgotten. A 
basic distinction that is both useful and necessary when working with the concept 
of resilience is the distinction between what one of the founding fathers of the con-
cept, Canadian ecologist Crawford Stanley Holling, has termed engineering and 
ecological resilience (Holling 1996). On the one hand, engineered ecological, eco-
nomical, or technological systems are governed by an equilibrium steady state, and 
in such systems resilience denotes the ability to “bounce back” to this steady state 
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after a shock. On the other hand, in natural ecosystems and complex adaptive sys-
tems, instabilities can flip the system into new stable domains with very different 
inner functions: “There is strong evidence that most ecosystem types can exist in 
alternative stable regimes, for instance lakes, coral reefs, deserts, rangeland, wood-
lands, and forests” (Brand & Jax 2007).  
The meaning of resilience has been transformed over the last decade and a half. 
Before the early 2000s resilience was primarily defined as a descriptive concept 
that in itself was neither perceived as good nor bad. An ecosystem may be highly 
resilient, but unwanted by humans, and some of the most feared and hated social 
systems such as terrorist networks and organized crime can be extremely resilient 
and therefore difficult to eradicate. Brand and Jax (2007), however, identified a 
general movement towards a more normative view of resilience that followed the 
introduction of the concept into a much broader spectrum of disciplines around the 
turn of the millennia. They suggested that resilience was becoming a “boundary 
object”, rather than a well-defined scientific concept, providing scholars from many 
disciplines with a crosscutting theme with common vocabulary that could enhance 
cooperation and coordination. This however happened at the cost of losing the prac-
tical value in a more precise ecological definition. More recently, Davoudi updated 
this analysis by asking in the title of a paper if resilience was “a bridging concept 
or a dead end” (2012).  
How to measure resilience is a question that has occupied researchers from many 
disciplines over the last several decades, and one which continues to do so. With 
regard to measurement, the above-mentioned distinction also proves useful: while 
engineered resilience can be thought of in terms of elasticity – resilience is exactly 
what provides such systems with the ability to absorb a shock and return to their 
steady state, and that which can be observed and measured – ecological resilience 
is more difficult to grasp. Holling states of ecological resilience, “In this case the 
measurement of resilience is the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed 
before the system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that 
control behavior” (1996: 33).  
In other words: if an engineered resilient system bounces back, an ecological 
resilient system bounces forward to a different state. These introductory remarks 
on the concept of resilience lead into a more historical approach to its development. 
A Brief History of Resilience3 
Resilience is a contested concept with a long and winding history, and numerous 
definitions or resilience exist – scholars have identified as many as 46! (Tierney 
2014: 162). It is not my aim to provide the reader with an exhaustive conceptual 
history of resilience (for such reviews, see Folke 2006, Brand & Jax 2007, Walker 
& Cooper 2011, Davoudi 2012 and Alexander 2013), rather I wish to highlight im-
portant milestones and definitions.  
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First of all, resilience must be differentiated from resistance, which is “the extent 
to which disturbance is actually translated into impact” (Adger 2000: 349). While 
a system’s resistance protects it from an agent of threat by deflecting the shock, 
resilience is what enables the system to absorb and bounce back from the impact. 
In his etymology of resilience, David Alexander demonstrates that the concept orig-
inates from Latin (resilire, “to bounce”), and that resilience was first used in a some-
what modern sense by Francis Bacon in 1625. Historically, the term developed from 
literature and law through scientific method in the 17th century, and entered the 
language of both mechanics and child-psychology in the 19th century. The engineers 
of the Industrial Revolution thought in terms of resilience when they added redun-
dant strength to structures such as buildings and bridges. In general, the concept 
retained the original core meaning of “bouncing back” regardless of the system be-
ing mechanical or psychological. It was not, however, until the second half of the 
20th century that resilience found its way into ecology and the social sciences (Al-
exander 2013).  
Overall, resilience denotes a system’s ability to withstand shock through absorp-
tion and adaptation. Traditionally, engineering, economy, and ecology viewed tech-
nological, financial, and natural systems as being able to return to equilibrium (a 
“normal state”) after subjection to a sudden, violent disturbance. From this ability 
arose robustness of such systems. The turning point came in 1973 when C.S. Hol-
ling in a seminal paper defined resilience as “a measure of the persistence of sys-
tems and of their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the 
same relationships between populations or state variables” (Holling 1973: 14). This 
idea of “resilient homoeostasis” (dynamic equilibrium) became highly influential 
in the following decades of integration of the concept into social science and climate 
studies, even if it was debated if it could be “transferred uncritically from the 
ecological sciences to social systems” (Adger 2000; Gallopín 2006: 299). Hol-
ling’s original ideas eventually matured into the Resilience Alliance, established in 
1999 as a multi-disciplinary research organization providing advice for sustainable 
development policy and practice. 
The modern multidisciplinary understanding of resilience also has its founda-
tions elsewhere. In the middle of the 20th century, Austrian economist Friedrich A. 
Hayek laid out the foundations for the Austrian school in Neoliberalism with his 
thoughts on self-organizing economies. Hayek “understood that shocks to eco-
nomic systems were caused by factors beyond our control, hence our thinking about 
such systems required systems of governance that were premised upon insecure 
foundations” (Evans & Reid 2014: 31). Rejecting the stable equilibrium sought by 
Keynesian economists, Hayek argued that markets exhibit such complex behavior 
that no government or other regulating body could ever hope to predict or control 
them. At the same time, markets themselves “have proven to be among the most 
resilient institutions, being able to recover quickly and to function in the absence of 
government” (ibid.: 35-36). Walker and Cooper point out that Holling and Hayek 
 Culture Unbound, Volume 7, 2015                                                                 [545] 
worked in very different fields and were inspired by very different political con-
cerns, but that their contributions nevertheless “have ended up coalescing in uncan-
nily convergent positions” (2011: 144). 
Around the time Holling wrote his 1973-paper, the term resilience was also 
picked up by psychologists (via anthropology) as the discipline’s substitute for ro-
bustness (Kolar 2011). By the turn of the millennium the term continued its trans-
formation, when the relationship between social and ecological resilience was de-
veloped into a broader understanding of community resilience (Adger 2000). The 
Hyogo Framework for Action (an UNISDR-initiative), adopted by 168 UN mem-
bers in 2005, placed resilience on the international agenda by focusing on the con-
cept of resilient communities – such as cities, neighborhoods, and networks – as a 
corner stone in future humanitarian development. And in recent years both the UK 
and US governments have taken on a “resilience approach” to Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion/emergency preparedness (Cabinet Office 2011; National Research Council 
2013).  
Although different disciplines and traditions still disagree on the exact meaning 
of the concept of resilience, a broad and commonly accepted definition today would 
be along the lines of “the capacity of an individual, community or system to absorb 
and adapt in order to sustain an acceptable level of function, structure, and identity 
under stress”. Note the emphasis on adaptation: what makes a complex adaptive 
system resilient is it’s learning and transformational capabilities, not its ability to 
merely resist a shock. As phrased by Folke: “[R]esilience is not only about being 
persistent or robust to disturbance. It is also about the opportunities that disturbance 
opens up in terms of recombination of evolved structures and processes, renewal of 
the system and emergence of new trajectories” (2006: 259). 
Complexity 
As with resilience, ‘complexity’ has permeated the scientific and, to a lesser degree, 
public discourse over the last few decades, addressing the still tighter coupling and 
growing interdependencies of modern societies: “As technological and economic 
advances make production, transport and communication ever more efficient, we 
interact with incrementally more people, organizations, systems and objects” 
(Heylighen et al. 2007: 117). 
Pioneered in the 1880s by Henri Poincaré, who showed that deterministic sys-
tems need not be predictable, the understanding of complexity was propelled for-
ward by Edward Lorenz and his famous “Butterfly Effect” in the 1960s. Complexity 
science in its purest form originated in general systems theory and cybernetics in 
the second half of the 20th century. Complexity science is, however, “little more 
than an amalgam of methods, models and metaphors from a variety of disciplines 
rather than an integrated science” (ibid.), but it nevertheless offers fundamentally 
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new insights into the properties and functions of man-made as well as natural com-
plex systems.  
Central to complexity science is an anti-reductionist approach. Contrary to the 
basic approach in Cartesian, Newtonian, and Laplacian science, complex systems 
cannot be fully understood by taking them apart and studying each of their parts 
individually. This is due to the “emerging properties”: synergies that are created 
through interactions and interdependencies within the system in an unplanned way. 
An aircraft or a cruise ship is a highly complicated, but predictable system, where 
you can tell exactly what will happen if you press a button or pull a lever. Insert 
operators and place the system in an environment with fuzzy boundaries (e.g. an 
airspace with other planes or a busy shipping lane), and performance variances that 
no designer ever thought of are bound to happen eventually. Emergence is thus key 
to understanding complex systems (Perrow 1999; Dekker et al. 2011).  
Unpredictability is not only a property of complex technological systems. Large 
social systems such as organizations, communities, and institutions also exhibit 
complex behavior due to many interactions between agents and subsystems. Such 
systems are therefore unpredictable and uncontrollable – something that often 
comes as a total surprise to economists, city planners, legislators, and regulators. 
Consequences are usually expensive and often also fatal. The failure of risk man-
agement in the late Industrial Age may be seen as the outcome of continuous appli-
cation of linear predictive methods on unpredictable complex systems. Such misin-
terpretations and misapplications have produced disasters such as Bhopal, Chal-
lenger, Deepwater Horizon and Costa Concordia (Dahlberg 2013b). 
In the Industrial Age, accidents and failures were understood as “a disturbance 
inflicted on an otherwise stable system” (Hollnagel et. al. 2006: 10), exemplified 
by Heinrich’s Domino-model (1931) representing the linearity of a technical system 
with chains of causes and effects. From this perception of systems came the hunt 
for “The Root Cause Effect” and an overall reductionist focus on broken/weak com-
ponents. The late Industrial Age saw the rise of complex linear accident models 
such as James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1990), adding more contributing fac-
tors in the form of “holes” in the barrier layers – but still based in error-trajectory. 
A much more non-linear approach to understanding performance and safety in 
complex systems was taken by the Resilience Engineering movement founded in 
2004 by Erik Hollnagel, David D. Woods, and other safety researchers. While 
Charles Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory (first published in 1984, see Perrow 
1999) represents the pessimist approach to complexity and adaptive systems, Re-
silience Engineering took from the outset an optimist’s stand, assuming that “an 
adaptive system has some ability to self-monitor its adaptive capacity (reflective 
adaptation) and anticipate/learn so that it can modulate its adaptive capacity to han-
dle future situations, events, opportunities and disruptions” (Hollnagel et al. 2011: 
128). 
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Resilience and Complexity 
The Resilience Engineering movement investigates socio-technological systems in 
which predictable technological processes interact with unpredictable human be-
havior. Together they form complex adaptive systems that are dynamic (ever 
changing) and able to adjust to conditions that cannot be built into the system at the 
design-phase. The movement’s definition of resilience reads: “The essence of resil-
ience is therefore the intrinsic ability of an organization (system) to maintain or 
regain a dynamically stable state, which allows it to continue operations after a ma-
jor mishap and/or in the presence of a continuous stress” (Hollnagel et al. 2006: 
16). David D. Woods, however, noted in the same publication that all systems 
adapt, even though some adaptation processes are very slow. Therefore, resilience 
in his view could not simply be the adaptive capacity of a system, prompting him 
to reserve the term to a system’s broader capability of handling performance varia-
tions. Failure, either as individual failure or performance failure on the system level, 
was seen by the founding fathers of Resilience Engineering as “the temporary ina-
bility to cope effectively with complexity” (ibid.: 3). Following from this, David D. 
Woods argues that “organizational resilience is an emerging property of complex 
systems” (ibid.: 43), thus connecting the two concepts explicitly. 
It follows from the above that an up-to-date understanding of resilience is more 
or less synonymous with what Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of The Black Swan4 
(2007), recently has termed “the antifragile”: systems that not only survive disturb-
ance and disorder but actually develop under pressure. In his usual eloquent style, 
Taleb in a footnote addresses the relationship between his antifragility concept and 
resilience: “the robust or resilient is neither harmed nor helped by volatility and 
disorder, while the antifragile benefits from them” (Taleb 2012: 17). But in this he 
confuses the terms in viewing resilience and robustness as synonymous: “Antifra-
gility is beyond resilience or robustness: The resilient resists shocks and stays the 
same; the antifragile gets better” (ibid.: 3). 
Taleb’s understanding of resilience is pre-Holling, and therefore somewhat un-
dermines Taleb’s otherwise interesting aim to “build a systematic and broad guide 
to nonpredictive decision making under uncertainty in business, politics, medicine, 
and life en general – anywhere the unknown preponderates, any situation in which 
there is randomness, unpredictability, opacity, or incomplete understanding of 
things” (ibid.: 4). He sees complex systems as weakened, even killed, when de-
prived of stressors, and defines the fragile as “what does not like volatility” in the 
form of randomness, uncertainty, disorder, error, stressors, etc. (ibid.: 12). How-
ever, he underlines that complex systems are only ‘antifragile’ up to a certain point. 
If the stressor is too powerful, even the most resilient system will be unable to ab-
sorb and adapt. The result, then, is catastrophic (ibid.: 69). 
If the resilience of complex systems cannot be designed (as it is an emerging 
property), it can, however, be exercised and cultivated. The principle of “hormesis”, 
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known by the ancients and (re)discovered by modern scientists in the late 19th cen-
tury, states that a small dose of poison can stimulate the development of an organ-
ism (ibid.: 37). Hormesis, on the social scale, means “letting people experience 
some, not too much, stress, to wake them up a bit. At the same time, they need to 
be protected from high danger – ignore small dangers, invest their energy in pro-
tecting themselves from consequential harm. […] This can visibly be translated into 
social policy, health care, and many more matters” (ibid.: 163). Hormesis can be 
likened to what Evans and Read call “endangerment” of agents in social systems 
which “is productive of life, individually and collectively” (Evans & Reid 2014: 
64). Erik Hollnagel and David D. Woods also note the need to provoke complex 
systems in their epilogue to Resilience Engineering movement’s first publication: 
“Resilience requires a constant sense of unease that prevents complacency” 
(Hollnagel et al. 2006: 355-56). This exact formulation also connects the resilience 
discourse with High Reliability Organization theory, as formulated by Karl Weick 
et.al, with its emphasis on chronic unease, fear of complacency, and attentiveness 
to weak signals (Weick & Sutcliffe 2007).  
The point is that for complex systems, disturbances, performance variations, etc. 
are beneficial. As Taleb points out: “machines are harmed by low-level stressors 
(material fatigue), organisms are harmed by the absence of low-level stressors 
(hormesis)” (Taleb 2012: 55. He also lists the most important differences between 
the mechanical (non-complex) and the organic (complex) (ibid.: 59). While the me-
chanical needs continuous repair and maintenance, dislikes randomness, and ages 
with use, the organic is self-healing, loves randomness (in the form of small varia-
tions), and ages with disuse. 
While fully accepting the need for constant endangerment of agents in complex 
systems in order to cultivate resilience, Evans and Reid also deliver a critique of 
what they identify as a Neoliberal strategy of governance: 
Rather than enabling the development of peoples and individuals so that they can as-
pire to secure themselves from whatever they find threatening and dangerous in 
worldly living, the liberal discourse of resilience functions to convince peoples and 
individuals that the dream of lasting security is impossible. To be resilient, the subject 
must disavow any belief in the possibility to secure itself from the insecure sediment 
of existence, accepting instead an understanding of life as a permanent process of 
continual adaptation to threats and dangers which appear outside its control. (Evans 
& Reid 2014: 68) 
In their view, the Neoliberal discourse, stemming from the theories of Hayek and 
Friedman, has been the main force driving resilience to its current omnipresence: 
“’Resilient’ peoples do not look to states or other entities to secure and improve 
their well-being because they have been disciplined into believing in the necessity 
to secure and improve it for themselves”, they write. “Indeed, so convinced are they 
of the worth of such capabilities that they proclaim it to be fundamental ‘freedom’” 
(Evans & Reid 2014: 77). 
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Another characteristic of complex system is “hysteresis” – a consequence of 
emergence among entities connected by nonlinear relationships. If a linear, predict-
able system shifts from one stable state to another, it can be switched back by re-
versing the process, Newtonian-style. This is what happens when you change gears 
back and forth in your complicated, but (usually) predictable car. In complex sys-
tems, however, “if a system is to return to its original configuration, it must take a 
different path” (National Research Council 2007: 26). 
A complex system, however, not only depends on its current inputs, but also on 
its history. Hysteresis contributes to the irreversibility of complex systems, and ren-
ders the “Best Practice”-approach to problem-solving in organizations and societies 
virtually useless, as the multitude of historical factors in any socio-economic system 
create vastly different initial states, even if they look similar on the surface. The 
path-dependency of complex systems forms the basis for what could be called the 
mantra of the turn towards resilience in emergency management: “Stop planning – 
start preparing.” We may predict that catastrophic events will unfold in the future, 
but it will always be different from last time. A resilient approach to emergency 
planning and crisis management is based less on rigid contingency plans than on 
heuristics and adaptability. 
Introducing the Cynefin Framework 
Complexity is not absence of order – rather it is a different form of order, of un-
order, or emergent order. While ordered systems are designed, and order is con-
structed top-down, un-ordered systems are characterized by un-planned order 
emerging from agents and sub-systems to the system as a whole. The Cynefin 
Framework developed by David Snowden offers a useful approach to sense-making 
by dividing systems and processes into three distinct ontologies: (1) Order, (2) un-
order and (3) chaos. Order and un-order co-exist in reality and are infinitely inter-
twined. Separation of the ontologies serves only as a sense-making tool at the phe-
nomenological level, as assistance in determining the main characteristics of the 
situation you find yourself in, thus guiding you towards the most useful managerial 
and epistemological tools for the given ontology (Snowden & Boone 2007; Renaud 
2012).  
In the ordered ontology, there is a correct answer, which may be reached through 
observation or analysis. In un-order, multiple right answers exist, but their nature 
defies observation and analysis. The three ontologies are divided into five domains. 
Two of them are in the ordered ontology: while the simple domain is characterized 
by obvious causalities that may be immediately observed and understood, the com-
plicated domain requires expert analysis – yet still yields an exact answer after re-
ductionist scrutiny. The un-ordered ontology is home to the complex and chaotic 
domains in the Cynefin Framework. In the complex domain, analysis fails due to 
feedback: any diagnosis is also an intervention that disturbs the system. Emergent 
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order may be facilitated, but is difficult to design, and impossible to predict. The 
chaotic domain is characterized by the lack of perceivable causality rendering any 
form of planned intervention useless – here you can only act and hope for the best, 
because chaos has no right answers at all as there is no relationship between cause 
and effect. There is also a fifth domain, namely that of disorder which is impossible 
to label and make sense of (Kurtz & Snowden 2003: 468). 
 
 
Figure 2. The Cynefin Framework, reproduced by permission from Cynthia Renaud. The 
known/simple and knowable/complicated domains are in the ordered ontology while the com-
plex and chaotic domains belong to the un-ordered ontology. The domain of disorder is found in 
the middle. 
 
The complex domain is characterized by weak central connections and strong 
distributed connections (ibid.: 470), meaning that agents interact directly instead of 
being controlled by an omniscient puppeteer like in the ordered domains. Lacking 
the common traits of order (i.e. structures, procedures, rules), the complex domain 
is governed primarily by co-operation between agents, mutual goals and interests, 
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and competing forces. It is from these infinite interactions and dependencies that 
un-order emerges. “Most crises arise as a result of some form of collapse of order, 
most commonly from visible order” (Snowden 2005: 51). The boundary between 
the ordered and the chaotic domains is strong, meaning that after a “fall” from order 
to chaos there is no easy way back other than moving through complexity. Falling 
over the boundary is also known as “Asymmetric Collapse”: 
Organizations settle into stable symmetric relationships in known space and fail to 
recognize that the dynamics of the environment have changed until it is too late. The 
longer the period of stability and the more stable the system, the more likely it is for 
asymmetric threats or other factors to precipitate a move into chaos. (Kurtz & Snow-
den 2003: 475) 
Right at this boundary we find catastrophes such as the Deepwater Horizon inci-
dent, a disastrous sudden transition from order to chaos produced by the “atrophy 
of vigilance” (Freudenburg & Gramling 2011). When the offshore semi-submersi-
ble drillrig exploded on April 20 210, a delegation from the company was on board 
to award the rig management a certificate for being the safest installation in the 
Mexican Gulf because seven years had passed without Lost Time Incidents on the 
Deepwater Horizon (Dahlberg 2013). A strategy of resilience may be seen as a 
countermeasure to exactly this fallacy: “To be resilient is to insist upon the necessity 
of vigilance in relation with one’s surrounding” (Evans & Reid 2014: 16). 
The Cynefin Framework does not imply a differentiated value between the do-
mains. Some systems perform very well in the ordered domain, while other systems 
benefit from operating (perhaps only momentarily) in the un-ordered domain. Only 
in the ordered domain, however, does a focus on efficiency through optimization of 
the separate parts of the system make sense. The reductionist approach to a complex 
system will never bear fruit. Likewise, traditional command and control-style man-
agement approaches are impossible to implement in the complex domain. Instead, 
complex systems are best managed by setting boundaries and adding or removing 
path-forming attractors (i.e. fixed points in the time-space of possible states). Con-
stant monitoring and probing through small-scale experiments facilitate continuous 
development of the complex system towards a desired outcome (Snowden & Boone 
2007). This resonates well with Holling’s comments on how to manage resilient 
ecological systems (Holling 1996: 38-41). 
Taleb identifies two separate domains: one where prediction is to some extent 
possible, and one where it is not (the Black Swan domain): “Social, economic, and 
cultural life lie the Black Swan domain, physical life much less so” (Taleb 2012: 
137-38). These are more or less comparable to the ordered and the un-ordered do-
mains in the Cynefin Framework: “There is, in the Black Swan zone, a limit to 
knowledge that can never be reached, no matter how sophisticated statistical and 
risk management science ever gets” (ibid.). The unpredictability of the complex 
domain is primarily produced by human collaboration. The “superadditive func-
tions” of people working together to innovate and create is impossible to forecast 
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(ibid.: 233), just as complexity arises in complicated systems when “they are 
opened up to influences that lie way beyond engineering specifications and relia-
bility predictions” (Dekker et al. 2011: 942). Erik Hollnagel also notes the limits to 
prediction in the complex domain: “It is practically impossible to design for every 
little detail or every situation that may arise, something that procedure writers have 
learned to their dismay” (Hollnagel et al. 2006: 16). 
The ordered domain is home to Gaussian curves and “statistical confidence”, 
while the complex domain is haunted by black swans and fat tails. In the ordered 
domain, normal distributions of height, for example, enable us to predict how tall 
the next person is likely to be – if we have a large enough sample for measuring the 
mean. Fat tails are someshat synonomous with Black Swans in the sense that they 
constitute “high impact, low probability events”.  
The so-called fat tail distributions found in the complex domain defy prediction: 
instead of convening around a mean, these samples consist of large numbers of not-
very-surprising cases and a few extreme outliers: “In the past decade or so, it seems 
like fat tails have been turning up everywhere: in the number of links to Web sites 
and citations of scientific papers, in the fluctuations of stock-market prices, in the 
sizes of computer files” (Hayes 2007: 204). 
The Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto discovered fat tails in the distribution of 
wealth in the early, industrialized societies, where a limited number of very rich 
people were balanced by a huge number of workers with a modest income. Para-
doxically, a larger sample size provides less useful information about the distribu-
tion among the majority of the cases, as the probability of including additional out-
liers increases. 
The shape of a probability distribution can have grave consequences in many areas of 
life. If the size and intensity of hurricanes follows a normal distribution, we can prob-
ably cope with the worst of them; if there are monster storms lurking in the tail of the 
distribution, the prospects are quite different. (Hayes 2007: 204) 
Taleb even argues that the famous 80/20 rule coined by Pareto in the beginning of 
the 20th century (that 80 % of land in Italy was owned by 20 % of the population) 
is outdated: Today, in the network society, we are “moving into the far more uneven 
distribution of 99/1 across many things that used to be 80/20” (Taleb 2012: 306). 
Such a development towards increased complexity constitutes an ever-growing 
challenge to the epistemological strategies we apply. History seems to drive a clock-
wise drift in the Cynefin Framework, while the Future exercises a counter-clock-
wise force upon the systems in question. It seems to be natural for people to seek 
order, for societies to convene towards the simple domain: “This phenomenon of 
grasping at order is common in people, governments, academia, and organizations 
of all shapes and sizes” (Kurtz & Snowden 2003: 476). And then disaster strikes 
and sends us plummeting over the fold into chaos. 
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Concluding Remarks 
The Cynefin Framework was designed by Snowden to be a sense-making device, 
and as I have demonstrated in this paper, it is an effective lens to view and under-
stand the concept of resilience through. The framework offers an arsenal of useful 
dynamic strategies that may be executed in the different domains. Many negative 
performance variances in our modern societies may be seen as the result of people, 
agencies, and governments trying to solve complex problems with solutions from 
the ordered toolbox – or vice versa. Instead, we should perhaps focus our efforts on 
planning for the predictable and preparing for the unpredictable. And this is ex-
actly what the turn towards resilience in emergency planning and management is 
about. 
Resilience is the ability of a complex system to adapt to disturbances and chang-
ing conditions, and resilience should be understood as an emergent property of the 
complex domain. This complies with recent developments in safety science accord-
ing to which safety itself is “an emergent property, something that cannot be pre-
dicted on the basis of the components that make up the system” (Dekker et al. 2011: 
942). Instead of looking for broken components in the causal chain that leads to an 
accident or disaster, a complex approach to safety science accepts competing truths 
and multiple explanations. From this follows that an accident might very well be 
no-one’s fault – but merely a negative outcome of unpredictable behavior among 
tightly coupled interdependencies. 
Resilience enables the system to cushion the effects of unforeseen disturbances 
by absorbing the shock and adapting to changing conditions, thus bouncing not back 
but forward to a more advanced level better suited for future hazards. Instead of 
focusing on the vulnerability of a socio-economic or socio-technological system, 
resilience addresses its potentials (Gallopín 2006: 294). Emergent order does ex-
actly this: Distributed agents of change work together to solve problems and face 
challenges, and out of their combined efforts emerges a new un-order capable of 
coping with the perturbation in question. But cultivating resilience means stopping 
clinging to plans and beliefs in predictive capabilities: 
Disasters do not follow preordained scripts. Even in situations where there is extensive 
disaster experience, those seeking to respond invariably confront unforeseen situa-
tions. One counterproductive way of dealing with the unexpected is to adhere to plans 
and procedures even when they are ineffective or offer no guidance in the face of 
unfamiliar challenges. (Tierney 2014: 208) 
Should all planning then be abandoned? No. Many processes and systems, technical 
as well as socio-economic, exhibit complicated or even simple behavior, and for 
those we should develop and rehearse plans which can be executed in case of emer-
gencies. But at the same time we must accept the unpredictability of complex sys-
tems and prepare for the unknown future by cultivating resilience. 
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For instance, a well-rehearsed method in emergency planning is scenario-build-
ing. Most agencies tasked with national emergency preparedness create and main-
tain registers of risk framed as most-likely scenarios, i.e. earthquakes, flooding, 
train crashes, industrial accidents (European Commission 2014). While scenario-
building and comparable methods work well in the ordered domain with its know-
able facts and right answers, they are of limited value when dealing with complex 
systems. Complexity is the realm of “unknown unknowns”, to paraphrase Donald 
Rumsfeld, and here the shortcomings of methods developed for the ordered domain 
become evident. How would it, for instance, be possible to construct a scenario to 
prepare for an emergent calamity that has not yet revealed itself? How can one as-
sess the probability of an event that has happened only once or perhaps never be-
fore? No analysis, no matter how thorough, will be able to identify the pattern of 
such a hazard before it actually manifests itself – because a pattern does not yet 
exist. 
A consequence of such applications of ordered epistemological tools on un-or-
dered ontologies is 20/20 hindsight, which – unfortunately – doesn’t lead to fore-
sight. Taleb calls this the “Lucretius problem”: humans have a tendency to prepare 
for the future by reviewing the past, but are not expecting anything worse than has 
already happened to happen (Taleb 2012: 46). Improvisation, creativity, and imag-
inative capacity are key elements in resilient strategies: “The challenge is  under-
stand (sic.) when a system may lose its dynamic stability and become unstable. To 
do so requires powerful methods combined with plenty of imagination” (Hollnagel 
et al. 2006: 17). The understanding of risk is challenged by complexity as no other 
concept. Defining risk as likelihood × consequences” of a future event, presupposes 
our ability to predict and assess the probability of the event in question, but this is 
much easier to do in the ordered domains than in cases of un-order. Uncertainty 
must be re-installed in the concept of risk from where it has been largely absent 
since Frank Knight established the distinction between uncertainty and risk (seen 
as measurable uncertainty) in 1921 (Jarvis 2011). 
Resilience cannot be created – and it does not have to be, as it is already present 
as an inherent, emerging, property of all natural as well as engineered complex 
adaptive systems. But it may be facilitated, nudged, exercised, and cultivated, un-
leashing strengths and resources hitherto hidden from linear-minded planners, con-
trollers, and predictors. Even when faced with clearly complex problems that un-
dergo fundamental changes while being solved (“diagnosis equals intervention”), 
these heirs of the Enlightenment insist on reductionist thoroughness in hope of full 
knowledge and perfect prediction. But, as Evans & Reid note (2014: 201): “Reason 
imagines nothing. It cannot create and thus it cannot transform. [...] It is not made 
for opening up new worlds, but enabling us to survive present ones.”  
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Notes 
1. I would like to thank my colleague Suhella Tulsiani and my supervisor Peter Kjær Mackie Jensen, 
both also at COPE, for useful comments. I also thank Helene von Ahnen A.S. Haugaard for com-
ments and proof reading. 
2. Note also the historic increase in usage of “resilience” in books published during the 1880s. This 
is probably due to the many publications on engineering, shipbuilding, bridges, etc. of this time - 
which was the apex of the age of engineering: “The first serious use of the term resilience in me-
chanics appeared in 1858, when the eminent Scottish engineer William J.M. Rankine (1820-72) 
employed it to describe the strength and ductility of steel beams” (Alexander 2013: 2710). 
3. This section is an elaborated version of Dahlberg (2013a). 
4. The “Black Swan” is a metaphor for unforeseen events with great consequences that in hindsight 
look like something that could have been predicted (i.e. the 9/11 terror attacks in the U.S.). The 
origins of the concept can be traced to Roman antiquity, and the term was common in London in the 
1600s as an expression of something most unlikely. In western discourse only white swans existed 
until 1697 when a Dutch explorer found black swans in Australia. Later, John Stuart Mill used the 
Black Swan metaphor when he described falsification in the 19th century: If we observe 1,000 swans 
that are all white and from these observations state that “all swans are white”, we fall victim to the 
inductive fallacy. The observation of a single black swan would falsify our claim. Lately, the Black 
Swan metaphor has also entered professional risk discourse (Aven 2014). 
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